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Abstract
This article explores how Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States, at the time of publication, had used international law to justify political decisions.

THE DEFECTION OF VIKTOR BELENKO:

THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW TO JUSTIFY POLITICAL DECISIONS

On September 6, 1976 Japanese Self-Defense Forces spotted an
intruding aircraft on their radar screen.

Despite a radio warning,

the plane continued to approach the northern Japanese island of
Hokkaido and then disappeared from radar.

Twenty-four minutes later,

the jet, a Russian MIG-25, circled the civilian airport at Hakodate
and landed.

Though two drag chutes were employed to aid in braking,

the jet rolled past the end of the mile-long runway, knocking down two
short antennae before coming to a halt.

The pilot emerged from the

cockpit, fired two warning pistol shots, and shouted his intentions:
to defect from the U.S.S.R. and receive asylum in the United States.
Such was the unusual entrance of Viktor Ivanovich Belenko, a
first lieutenant in the Russian Air Force, into the free world, an
entrance which embarrassed the Soviet Union and strained that
government's already tense relationship with Japan.

In Russia's

attempts to regain control over Belenko, in Japan's wish to maintain
the friendship of both the United States, and the Soviets, and in the
Pentagon's desire to learn more about the escaped pilot and his plane,
the three countries looked to the tenets of international law for
direction.

Each analyzed prospective plans in view of the customs,

general principles, and treaties which linked the nations together.
Each State's defense of its subsequent actions on legal grounds
45

46
illustrates the increasing emphasis on legal solutions for political
problems.
Japanese Measures
Officials and citizens of Japan were terrified by the ease
with which Belenko eluded the national defense system.

But beyond

being frightened, officials were perplexed over what should be done
with their uninvited guest.

In arriving at an answer, the Japanese

government considered legal practices, both municipal and international,
as well as the extralegal implications of its actions.
The police immediately arrested Lieutenant Belenko.

He was

held in custody for six violations of Japanese law, including violation
of Japanese airspace, abnormal low flying, damage to airport equipment,
illegal entry, and illegal possession of a firearm.
The treatment of this unusual situation as a routine criminal
case possessed several advantages for the Japanese.

First, it lodged

the pilot safely away until the political arm of the government could
decide on proper action.

In addition to protecting him from the Soviet

government, this move thwarted the intention of the United States to
interrogate him.

Both the armed forces and the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs were able to deny requests made by the Soviet Union, the United
States, and by four North Atlantic Treaty countries, explaining that
the police had custody of both plane and pilot. 2

Not until municipal

police had finished their investigation would the other governmental
branches gain custody.

By downplaying the incident, the government

gained time for consideration of whether to return Belenko to Russia,

send him to the United States or keep him in Japan.
The Ministries of Justice and of Foreign Affairs did consider
their options, notwithstanding the police investigation.

Both Belenko

and the aircraft were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Japanese
3
government.
Each could be handled by using a variety of legal tools.
Any decision made would aggravate foreign relationships by forcing
Japan to favor either the Soviet Union or the United States.
One method of disposition, that of criminal imprisonment, would
have greatly alleviated Japan's international dilemna.

The United

States could not have pressed a claim for his release.

Likewise, if

Belenko were punished in Japan, the principle of double jeopardy
would immunize him from certain Soviet criminal actions.4

His sentence

ended, the pilot would have been free to seek asylum in the United
States.

The time delay would have allowed the Russians to minimize

the value of Belenko's confidential knowledge.
Deportation, following the procedures of the Japanese immigra5
tion law, would have also solved the problem of the pilot's unwanted
presence.

Because Belenko entered Japan illegally he could have been

denied permission to land by the immigration inspector at the port of
6
entry.
He then would have been transferred to a special inquiry
officer for a hearing. 7

If the officer had affirmed the inspector's

finding, the alien could have filed an objection with the Ministry of
Justice.

(Despite a determination that the alien's objection was
8
land.
groundless, the Minister may grant special permission to
Otherwise, the alien would be returned to the country of which he is a
national or, if this could not be effected, he would be deported to

any other country according to his wishes.)How would Belenko have fared under this procedure?

Excluding

a grant of citizenship or asylum from the United States, his probability of avoiding deportation would have been low.

Japanese immigration

authorities are generally harsh in application of the deportation rules.
They have deported several aliens who would clearly have been perse10
Indeed, Japanese
cuted by their nations for political crimes.
officials, in general, have rarely shown much concern for political
11
despite the declaration in the preamble to the
criminals or refugees
Japanese constitution of the right of all peoples of the world "to live
in peace, free from fear and want."'1 2

The discretion of the Minister

of Justice to grant special landing permission is viewed by the Tokyo
High Court as "an act of grace" by the State and hence, non-justiciable.

13 Without the protection of judicial review, the alien has no

way of challenging an arbitrary order of deportation by the Minister of
To date, the Minister has shown little mercy.14

Justice.

The probability of deportation makes the possibility of asylum
in Japan unlikely.

Though early writers on international law consid15

ered the grant of political asylum to be an obligation of the State,
presently it is viewed merely as a legal power of the State. 1 6

The

procedure for granting asylum is similar to that for deportation, and
the determination of the Minister of Justice is nonreviewable by the
As in a deportation case, an alien can only depend upon
17
administrator.
his luck and the charity of an usually uncharitable
judiciary.

The Japanese government had a choice of several established
procedures for determining the future of Lieutenant Belenko.

Few

49
international guidelines, however, aided the government in the disposition of the MIG-25 fighter plane.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs

asserted that when airplanes of one country made emergency landings in
the territory of another, the aircraft and their pilots would usually
be returned.

However, he added, "There is no established international

practice conerning what to do with the aircraft used by such
defectors." 1 8

Unauthorized overflight by a foreign military aircraft

9
represents an infringement of the sovereignty of the affected State.1

It is generally admitted that the overflown country is free to deal as
it wishes with both aircraft and crew. 20

Furthermore, it is common

practice to confiscate a craft which has entered the country without
going through customs procedure.

21

The instant case was unfortunately complicated by the plane's
novel status--a stolen foreign military aircraft.
are traditionally immune from confiscation.

Such State craft

Some nations, including

the United States, consider such immunity to exist only with the consent of the receiving government, viewing such consent as merely a
voluntary waiver of the nation's exclusive and absolute territorial
jurisdiction.

As such, a waiver may be withdrawn at will by the

nation. 22
Other jurists and several States, including the Soviet Union,
look upon the immunity of State property from security measures and
from confiscation as an expression of a fundamental principle of
international law--the sovereignty of States. 2 3

The Japanese govern-

ment was understandably interested in examining a plane which had
penetrated its air defense with such ease.

With conflicting views on

50
the legality of inspecting or confiscating a foreign State aircraft,
the Japanese unfortunately received little consel from international
legal principles.

Soviet Measures
The Soviet Union had two courses of action open for its
securing the return of Viktor Belenko.

One such measure would have

involved the criminal indictment of Belenko for stealing State
property.

By presenting Belenko as a criminal, a request for extra-

dition would have been in order:

The Soviet Union, however, perhaps

too embarrassed to admit the truth, attempted to achieve his return in
another manner.
The Soviet Embassy, upon-discovery of Belenko's action asked
the Japanese Foreign Ministry for permission to interview the pilot
and for recognition of the Soviet government's "inviolable right to
protect its military secrets" by returning the plane. 24

The Soviets
25

based the first request on the Japan-U.S.S.R. Consular Convention,
which states, at Article 31:

1. A consular officer shall, within the consular district,
be entitled to interview and communicate with any national of
the sending State . . .
2. The receiving State may not in any way restrict the
communication of a national of the sending State with the consul26
ate, or his access thereto.
The Japanese Foreign Ministry, first said it needed to inves27
tigate the incident before granting an interview,
then later
refused.

The Soviet Embassy argued that this violated the consular

agreement.

The ministry held, however, that Belenko had no desire for

such a meeting.

Therefore, the spirit of the agreement which was

aimed at "protecting humanitarian rights of Japanese and Soviet
subjects in each country" was not contravened.

28

After receiving four more demands for an interview, the Foreign
Ministry persuaded Belenko to meet with a Russian embassy official to
show that the pilot was not being kept against his will. 2 9

The offi-

30
cial urged him to return to the Soviet Union, but the pilot refused.

The official Tass press agency characterized the short meeting as a
"'farce' that showed the pilot had been drugged.

' 31

The agency also stated that Belenko had lost his bearings
during an ordinary training flight and been forced to land in Japan
32
due to a lack of fuel.
The Soviets appeared to have had several
reasons for assuming this position.

Besides explaining away a most

embarrassing incident, the Russians may have hoped to gain at least
partial immunity from Japanese jurisdiction for both Belenko and the
jet.
Regardless of Belenko's intent, all legal authorities and the
Soviet Union itself would agree that he had violated Japan's air33
space.
The Convention on International Civil Aviation (1944 Chicago
Convention), to which both Japan and the U.S.S.R. are signatories,
holds that "every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over
the airspace above its territory." 3 4

Furthermore, Soviet spokesmen

often dwell on the respect accorded by the Soviet Union to the airspace
sovereignty of other States. 3 5

And finally, the Soviet Union is

extremely harsh in its punishment for unauthorized flight into the
U.S.S.R. 36
When entry is made by an aircraft in distress, however, it is

52
customary that both the plane and its crew are immune from prosecu37
tion.
Unfortunately, while a great amount of litigation and
legislation has involved civil aircraft, little has been written
about the rights and obligations of military aircraft in foreign
38
territory.
Several authors have suggested the crew and aircraft may
not be subjected to criminal penalties or unnecessary detention in
the instance of a distress landing; 3 9 but, as yet no multi-lateral
40
agreements have been spoken on the issue.
The Soviets may have
expected the unsettled condition of the law to allow them to assert a
right to Belenko's immunity from Japanese prosecution and his return4
One path not taken by the U.S.S.R. was that of an extradition
42
request.
Traditionally, extradition requests must be honored only
if based on a treaty. 4 3

The Soviet Union and Japan, had, in fact,

agreed to an extradition treaty. 4 4

But as it had been created before

the Russian revolution, its present validity was doubtful.

45

Extradition is not limited to treaty situations, however.
While the harboring State has no duty to return the fugitive, it
46
sometimes possesses the right to do so.
Japan has, in similar
situations, granted extradition requests which were independent of
treaty.

Under the Extradition Law of 1964, the Japanese Minister of

Foreign Affairs sends the foreign request to the Minister of Justice.
At his discretion, the request may be denied as inappropriate as a
matter of law or it may be filed with the Tokyo High Court for examination.

After offering the fugitive the opportunity to defend himself,

the court may deliver a decision of extradition.

The Minister of

Justice again passes on the request, this time as to the weight of

53
the evidence, after which he either affirms or reverses the court's
47

decision.
Three barriers to extradition exist under this law.

A deter-

mination of any one of them makes compliance with the extradition
request unlikely.

The first, common to many treaties and conventions

48
is the refusal to extradite a political offender.

Besides examining

the acts of the fugitive, the harboring State should give careful
consideration to the motives of the requesting State.

If the request-

ing State seeks the fugitive for reasons other than the ordinary
enforcement of criminal law, or if the actor's purpose was protest

against a policy of the State rather than furtherance of his own
private interests, the requested State might well refuse to extradite
49

the offender.
The interpretation given to political crime in Japanese
jurisprudence is a narrow one.

Not only must the act be one committed
50
for the purpose of violating the political order,
but also the
requesting State must have instituted criminal proceedings against the

51
perpetrator.

In the instant case Belenko's theft of the jet may not

have been politically motivated. 5 2

Furthermore, he would qualify as a

political criminal only if the U.S.S.R. had instituted action against
him for crimes which were political in nature.

If the U.S.S.R. limited

itself to prosecution for the theft of a State sircraft while omitting

53
charges of desertion or treason,
Soviet extradition request.

Japan might well have honored the

Thus, even if Belenko had been considered

a political criminal, he would not have been absolutely protected
from extradition.

54
The Tokyo High Court in 1971 and again in 1972 held that while
the right of non-extradition is established in international law, the
obligation of the State not to extradite is not generally established. 54

The court, basing its opinion on the writings of Japanese
55
jurists and on the Harvard Draft Convention on Extradition,
stated
that a sovereign has the discretion to extradite or not. 56

The policy

of non-extradition, in short, is only a "humanitarian right" not a
"legal obligation."
Despite the possibility that Japanese officials might have
returned Belenko, the U.S.S.R. made no request for extradition. 57
Perhaps the Soviets were too embarrassed to admit formally that one of
these top pilots had defected with one of their most advanced aircraft.
Perhaps they despaired of being granted an extradition request in view
of strong United States pressure.

Whatever the reason, they chose not

to use a potentially fruitful method for the return of Viktor Belenko.
The Soviet government did then have some support in international law for demanding the return of the pilot.
justified in ordering the return of the aircraft.

They were less
According to

several jurists, all proprietary rights in the plane were lost when it
58
The Soviet Union, however, claimed
entered Japanese territory.
immunity from security measures and confiscation on two grounds.
First, the landing in Japan was necessary for the safety of the aircraft and pilot.

They had entered in distress. 59

Even barring that

admission, the Soviet jurists would contend that State property is
always immune from inspection or execution.60

Thus, with justifica-

tions based in international law theory, the Russians demanded the

return of, Belenko and the MIG-25 jet aircraft.
The Japanese government, however, realized the shortcomings
of the possible solutions.

Political considerations prevented a grant

of asylum; humanitarian reasons spoke against deportation; and legal

principles foreclosed extradition.

No course of action neatly resolved

all the conflicting considerations.

Yet the longer Belenko remained

in Japan, the more embarrassing his presence became.

Some determina-

tion had to be reached.
Happily for Belenko, the chosen course of action was just what

he had hoped for.

The pilot's first act upon landing had been to

request asylum in the U.S.61

Upon receipt of this news, President
62
Ford personally granted the request.
Despite the President's
willingness to accept Belenko, he could do nothing without Japan's
consent to relinquishment of custody.
The Japanese foreign minister, eager to be rid of Belenko,
agreed to transfer him to the United Stares, 6 3 an act accomplished
soon after the pilot had finishing advising engineers on the dismantling of his aircraft. 64

Legally Belenko had not even entered

Japan but rather reamined in custody at the border.

Because he

voluntarily agreed to immigrate to the U.S., no exclusion adjudication

65
was necessary.

Thus, little legal machinery was in fact used by the

Japanese in resolution of this extraordinary incident.

United States
But what of the methods used for immigrating a Russian
military deserter into the United States?

The laws on such actions

56
have varied considerably over the years due to a tug of war between
Congress and the President.

While Congress has usually sought to pro-

mote the economic well-being of its constitutents through alien
exclusion, the President has supported the image of America as a haven
for the world's oppressed.6 6

Literacy tests, English language require-

ments, and even outright suspension of immigration were proposed; most
67
of which were passed by the Congress and vetoed by the President.

Under present immigration laws, 6 8 Belenko's admission could
have been effected by any one of three procedures, each of which
varied in requirements demanded and benefits conferred.
The first method, standard immigrant preference visa application,69 would have been of little aid to the Russian pilot. 70

Due to

normal processing delays, an alien outside the U.S. must often wait
71
over two years before receiving a visa.

Congress established two other means of entry specifically
intended for refugees as a result of the backload of applications
and the competition for entry among variously qualified aliens.
are the following:

They

conditional entry under the Fair Share Act and

parole.
In 1960 the United States, as its contribution to the solution
of the European refugee problem, signed the Fair Share Act which was
incorporated into the Immigration and Nationality Act in 1962. 72_ This
allows the Attorney General to grant conditional entry to those aliens
who have fled their own nations because of racial, religious, or
political persecution or who have been "uprooted by catastrophic
natural calamity." 73

This procedure is severely limited in three

57
respects.

First, only 10,200 refugees may be admitted in one year.

Secondly, the alien makes his application in only eight specified
74
And third, the applicant must present an assurance form
countries.
from a U.S. citizen.

75

Because of these restrictions most refugees have entered by
parole, 7 6 § 212(d)5 of the Immigration Act which grants the Attorney
General free discretion:
to parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions
as he may prescribe for emergent reasons or for reasons deemed
strictly in the public interest any alien applying for
admission.77
As with conditional entry under § 203(a)7, this gives the accepted alien
limited rights.

He is, as it were, "standing at the waters' edge" and

subject to non-appealable exclusion hearings if either the conditions
for his grant of entry end or he commits a criminal offense.
Unlike entry under § 203(a)7, however, the Attorney General may
grant entry to those who are not true refugees.

Under the former

provision, an alien bears the burden of proving refugee status.
Belenko's case this might have been difficult.
Immigration Appeals

78

In

Both the Board of

and the director of the Immigration Service

79

have stated that not all escapees from Communist countries should be
considered refugees.

Belenko's defection, as we have seen, may have

been economically and emotionally motivated rather than due to political persecution.

No requirement of refugee status lurks in§ 212(d)5.

Thus this provision has allowed the Attorney General to parole into
81
80
150,000
over 400,000 Cubans,
the country 15,000 Hungarians,
8
Vietnamese 82 and recently 1,000 stateless Uganda Asians. 83

58
Under both these plans, nonetheless, the alien has few procedural safeguards.

Though he has the right to inspect and rebut any

derogatory evidence 84 he has no right to appeal an adverse decision.
85

At most he may ask for a reopening or reconsideration of his case.

Because of the lack of protection afforded political escapees,
several have suffered unjust refoulment. 8 6

The most celebrated case

was that of Simas Kudirka, a Lithuanian seaman, who jumped from his
own Russian ship to a U.S. Coast Guard cutter and requested asylum.87
Instead of contacting the State Department or placing the escapee in
protective custody, the U.S. captain allowed other Soviet sailors to
capture Kudirka.

They beat him unconscious and returned him to their

craft.
President Nixon and members of Congress expressed their shock
and disappointment over the incident, which generated guidelines to
protect those requesting asylum. 88

Though nowhere defined in United

States regulations, asylum appears to be the political counterpart to
parole. 89

The distinction between the two is not based on any

qualitative differences, but merely on the political nature of the
alien's request.
Thus in 1972, in response to both the Kudirka incident and to
90

the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,

the State Depart-

ment issued guidelines for response to asylum requests.

All such

requests were to receive careful scrutiny "taking into account
91
humanitarian principles, applicable laws, and other factors."

Two years later the Immigration and Naturalization Service
itself issued application and decision rules for persons seeking

asylum.9 2

Of particular interest is the rule for decision.

This

requires that the INS officer involved request the views of the State
Department before making his decision unless the application appears

93
to him clearly meritorious or clearly lacking in substance.
in that situation, the State Department must be notified.
alien has no right of appeal.

Even
A rejected

Nonetheless, if he receives a favorable

statement from the State Department, his case automatically goes to
the regional commissioner of INS for final decision.

Although the

State Department finds most such requests frivolous, Belenko had little
to fear.

President Ford's need for publicity in a campaign year and

the importance of Belenko's gift to the United States, knowledge of
the MIG-25, assured the pilot's grant of asylum into the United States.
The United States government had a strong interest in inspect94
ing the MIG-25 as well as its pilot.
Despite the technical, as well
as political, importance of such an inspection, the United States
quietly awaited Japan's permission.

To openly advise the Japanese,

95
though permissible under the U.S.-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty,

would

have strained the already weak bonds between Tokyo and the Kremlin.
Beyond this, the United States feared the protest of left-wing
Japanese which could adversely affect America's own relationship with
that country.

96

Permission to inspect the aircraft, though at first
98

denied, 9 7 eventually was granted dueto Japanese engineering ignorance
as much as to covert pressure by the United States.
In retrospect, the influence of international law on each
country's decision-making is difficult to evaluate.
decisions were guided by political considerations.

Most of the
Nonetheless,

60principles of international law appear to have been used to.give
credence and justification to political determinations.

While nations

may continue to do as they please, it is probable that the tenets of
international law may serve more frequently as guidelines for action
and this incident is one more piece of evidence of the continuing
presence of international law in the world community.
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